I consider myself an infant when it comes to my philosophical stature, but I continue to find it extremely fascinating. This semester I enrolled in a Philosophy of Religion class because it was obviously a topic that interested me and, to be honest, I wanted to refine my arguments so that I could shame my theistic friends for their beliefs. I felt that religious belief was totally irrational and unreasonable; you could say that I entered the class an unfriendly atheist. What I have taken from the class however has been surprising.
William L. Rowe is one of the authors of the textbook we are using in that class. He is a philosopher and atheist and is a professor emeritus at Purdue University. There is an article of his in the book that discusses a few forms of atheism. Rowe points out that there are three ways that an atheist may view the theist. First, “the atheist may believe that no one is rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists.” This he calls “unfriendly atheism.” Second, “the atheist may hold no belief concerning whether any theist is or isn’t rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists.” This he calls “indifferent atheism.” And last, “the atheist may believe that some theists are rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists.” This he calls “friendly atheism.”
To clarify, it may be good to point out that Rowe does not say that the friendly atheist accepts the theistic belief as true, but merely that the theist is not irrational in his or her beliefs. It may also be good to point out that he is discussing the rationality of religious belief and not the reasonableness of theistic belief. A distinction can be seen in an example: an individual may rack up tons of debt because he/she is planning on winning the lottery to pay it off. Yes these thoughts may in the strictest sense of the word be rational, but they are certainly not reasonable.
But here is where it becomes a little tricky. For in this case, both parties are privy to the same information yet they come to different conclusions. Can both be rationally held? Or must one be irrational by necessity? Rowe believes the former. Another author in a separate article in the book uses an example in science. Can two researchers be studying the same scientific question and come to separate conclusions and both be rational in their decisions? It seems that they can.
Rowe then goes on, “What sort of grounds might a theist have for believing that God exists? Well, he might endeavor to justify his belief by appealing to one or more of the traditional arguments: Ontological, Cosmological, Teleological, Moral, etc. Second, he might appeal to certain aspects of religious experience… Third, he might try to justify theism as a plausible theory in terms of which we can account for a variety of phenomena.”
Again, it is irrelevant whether or not you believe these arguments to be true, when considering their rationality. Rowe believes that the arguments put forth by theists are false, but he also thinks the arguments can be rationally held by the believer. He would therefore consider himself a friendly atheist, and I am inclined to agree with him at this point. I am still an atheist, but I no longer look at all religious people as morons. Hopefully I didn’t slaughter Rowe’s argument too much in my interpretation. But anyway, I figured I would toss this out to all of you to see what your thoughts were on the matter.
How do you view religious belief? If you are atheist, are you friendly or unfriendly?
I’m a friendly theist.
Me too. As I say below, it is hard to give a serious read to Aristotle and Aquinas and not be a friendly atheist. Similarly, one cannot read Nietzsche and other thoughtful atheists without being a friendly theist.
I see no argument here of how anyone could rationally believe that a god exists. Any argument I have seen for god I can disprove with simple logic, how can logic be different for different people?
Great post, Tyson. This is, I think, a worthwhile discussion for SHAFTers.
Logan – I’ll take you up on your challenge. Please refute the cosmological argument with “simple logic”.
I cannot help but note the incredible hubris in thinking you have mastered “simple logic” in a way that some of the greatest philosophers in history have not. Keep in mind, Aristotle made a cosmological argument, and he is the one who established logic as a discipline!
Rowe’s is an atheist, but he thinks the cosmological argument is deductively valid. (For a bit of “simple logic” – the question of validity is different from the question of truth. An argument is valid if the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, without paying attention to the truth or falsity of the premises). So do you think the argument is invalid, Logan? If so, why? Or, rather, do you think it is valid but unsound (its premises are not all true).
The soundness of the cosmological argument really depends upon is the truth of a principle of causality (sometimes known as the Principle of Sufficient Reason or PSR). In Aquinas’ argument, the PSR could be stated as ‘that what does not have existence on its own must have a cause’. On Rowe’s view, depending on how you construe this principle of causality, the argument works or does not work. Rowe rightly recognizes that it is rational to believe certain versions of the PSR (even if he happens to not).
Hume is typically credited with “doing away with” the PSR. He thinks you can conceive of something simply appearing, without a cause (that I can think of an object without conceiving of its cause). It is worth noting that he thinks we must assume the PSR for our day to day living, but he denies it is really true. But can we really conceive of something appearing without a cause? Hume, I think, conflates “imagining” and “conceiving” here. Take this example: suppose you are standing on the Quad with nothing in front of you and then – pop! – there is a car in front of you that came “from nowhere”. Can you imagine that? I suppose. But can you conceive of it? Well, how will you respond to this suddenly appearing car? Will you say, “Gee, Hume was right, there are effects without any necessary connection to a cause.” Or will you say, “Where did that freaking car come from?” (that is, in conceiving of the event you will immediately move to their being some cause for its appearance).
I frankly think that anyone who has read much philosophy at all is a friendly atheist. It is hard, after actually reading Augustine, Aristotle, Aquinas, and others , to come away thinking “What a bunch of irrational morons.” Sadly, the popular prophets of unfriendly “new” atheism (say, Dawkins) are embarrassingly inept in the field of philosophy. Even philosophers like Dennett are frankly ignorant of the historical arguments. Thoughtful atheistic philosophers that I know admit as much. Of course, none of this means you have to be a theist. It just means it is foolish to think that arguments for theism are simply idiotic and capable of being upended by “simple logic.”
I think the reason these debates have lasted for hundreds of years is because both sides make very valid, rational arguments. If it really was that “simple” then I would think this would be a nonissue today.
Excellent post, Tyson. Having spent years as a friendly theist, I now fit Rowe’s description of ‘friendly atheist.’ Yes, many theists have a faith that is rationally justifiable, and I’m lucky to count so many of them as friends. Actually, most rationally-justified theists share my dislike of less thoughtful atheists and theists–and, as Nietzsche would say, the best indicator of someone’s capacity for friendship is their ability to make enemies.
If I disagree a little with Rowe’s description, it concerns the ambiguity of the term ‘friendly.’ For those of us who like friends who question our assumptions and challenge our thinking (even while recognizing their own limitations), then the term works. But on some level ‘friendly atheism’ sounds too much like other contemporary shibboleths like ‘tolerance’–it can easily deteriorate into ‘lets agree not to criticize each other, and just let everybody go on as before.’ There’s a very real pressure for atheists to try to portray themselves as ‘just like anyone else,’ as if to assure people that they pose no threat to common beliefs or society’s values. In my estimation, this robs secularism of what may be its greatest power–its ability to critique even those values and ideas that seem most foundational. Yes, many theists are rationally justified in their beliefs–but to qualify as each others’ friends, both theists and non-theists shouldn’t diminish the threat each other pose to the others’ worldview.
You make a very good point, and perhaps I should have mentioned that more in the article. Thanks for pointing that out!