2010
05.29

If god exists, he/she/it (I’ll use ‘he’) has gone to great lengths to conceal that fact. In Biblical times, the evidence for god’s existence seemed ubiquitous and undeniable. God helped the Israelites in their exodus from Egypt—sending plagues, parting the Red Sea, and so on. Miracles were also replete in the New Testament. According to the gospels, Jesus cured the deaf and blind, raised the dead, walked on water, and performed countless other miracles.

So what miracles are there today? Celestial cameos on burnt toast and coffee stains don’t compare to the attestations of god in the Bible. From a Mormon perspective, too, there is a relative dearth of miracles. In the early church, reports of angelic visitations, demonic encounters, faith healings and speaking in tongues were commonplace. And whereas Joseph Smith regularly received revelations, god seems to have put today’s church leaders on hold.

It appears that god is hiding, and that is problematic for theists who believe that god is loving and concerned about our belief in him. German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche wrote:

A god who is all-knowing and all-powerful and who does not even make sure his creatures understand his intentions—could that be a god of goodness? Who allows countless doubts and dubieties to persist, for thousands of years, as though the salvation of mankind were unaffected by them, and who on the other hand holds out frightful consequences if any mistake is made as to the nature of truth? Would he not be a cruel god if he possessed the truth and could behold mankind miserably tormenting itself over the truth?

This is known in the scholarly literature as the problem of divine hiddenness. J.L. Schellenberg in his landmark book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993) re-articulates this problem into what he calls “the argument from reasonable nonbelief.” Schellenberg suggests that the absence of evidence for god is evidence of god’s absence, such that nonbelief in god is reasonable. And why, if god wants a personal relationship with his creation, would he make nonbelief reasonable? There are people (myself included) who would believe in god were there sufficient evidence. Even the world’s most famous atheist, Richard Dawkins, has stated that he wants to believe in god, but cannot.

It would make sense, then, for god to come out of hiding. But some believers worry that this would render faith in god useless. Andrew over at Irresistible (Dis)Grace had a thoughtful response to this concern:

I think the issue is that “belief in god” and “faith in god” imply something a little more than what people often want it to mean.

I think the scriptures even point out the distinction. See, when someone [argues that God's showing himself would nullify faith], then they seem to mean that what it means to believe in god is to believe he exists. According to this argument, if you believe in God (the right one, supposedly), then that is the prize.

But is that the prize?

No. As James 2:19 points out, even the demons believe that there is a god (and apparently, they believe in the right one). But do demons have the prize? No.

The issue is that believing in the existence or nonexistence isn’t the critical distinction. Rather, I think that belief and faith in god entails something more substantive…something like a trust in his ways and laws. Obedience to him. The following of him.

In this way, I don’t think that if God showed himself, faith would be nullified. Instead, if this life were a test to see who would follow and who wouldn’t, we would be on equal footing (because we would know that god exists) and the only thing that would matter is whether we would follow or not.

And shouldn’t that be the test—not whether we believe in god, but whether we follow him? I’d like to hear your thoughts.

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55 comments so far

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  1. My thoughts are that even if s/he/it exists, if the rules are in any way close to those of any religion, s/he/it doesn’t deserve my devotion or respect. As soon as people believe in a deity, they often do good not simply because it’s the right thing to do, but because they either want a reward or want to avoid punishment. Belief in gods decrease humanity’s ability for true altruism. Obeying a god isn’t the measure of a moral person.

    I can’t think of any situation where there could exist a god which would be worthy of my worship. It’s just too authoritarian. What gives the god the right to control me? Even if I was “created” by some god, the idea that that god therefore has rights to my body or soul is ludicrous. Human parents create their own children and yet aren’t (in an equitable and ethical society) given the right to control their children’s lives or destiny. The idea that human parents would only love, support or reward their grown children if they do exactly what they say and believe exactly what they believe is behaviour that we deem abusive and manipulative for humans. I see all gods the same way, especially the Abrahamic god.

    • My only remark about Craig’s post is this: what seems to be an intellectual rejection of God in fact originates in the will. For Craig, it comes down to radical autonomy – ‘What gives God the right to control me?’ It is Craig’s will that rejects God, not his mind. His mind follows his will and conforms itself to it. In fact, his mind is so obedient to his will (which demands absolute autonomy), that it has crippled his intellect. Craig says he “can’t even think of” a God that is worthy of worship. The movement of his will has made it literally inconceivable for his mind. That is remarkable.

      Point is, atheism is not first and foremost a movement of the intellect or science. It is a movement of the will. One can see why I often remark that atheism is a basically adolescent movement. “Who are you to tell me how to live my life?!” snarls the 16 year old, as he chafes against the “unjust” curfew.

      How often do you think about the relationship between your will and intellect? People should think about these things.

      One other thought on the main post: there certainly is a sense in which God hides, and there is great mystery in this. But there is equally a sense in which man hides from God. Recall that it was not God that was hiding from man in Eden, it was man hiding from God. Genesis 3: “8 Then the man and his wife heard the sound of the LORD God as he was walking in the garden in the cool of the day, and they hid from the LORD God among the trees of the garden. 9 But the LORD God called to the man, ‘Where are you?’”
      So, in a way, we don’t seek God as much as we must needs accept his seeking of us.

      I just came back from a weeklong Fides et Ratio (faith and reason) seminar, where we read Church Fathers, Doctors, and Popes. From some of the earliest writings in the Christian tradition, you have people making the point that God is really not that hidden because he made himself manifest to us in the created order and can be known through natural reason. “They [man] could look up into the immensity of heaven, and by pondering the harmony of creation come to know its Ruler, the Word of the Father, Whose all-ruling providence makes known the Father to all.” Athanasius (this is written around 318)

      This data – that the world is orderly – is manifest to everyone. Science assumes the orderliness or lawfullness of nature. But the scientist cannot explain why it is orderly. Science cannot give an account of itself.

      Atheists do not believe because they refuse to believe. Because of disordered wills – NOT disordered intellects – they do not see God’s hand in the orderliness of nature, the evidence for which is overwhelming and the presumption of which is the condition for the possibility of science. But that is, again, a function of the will and not the intellect. Athanasius, among many many others, makes the point. This line comes shortly after the one I cited above: “So burdened were they will their wickedness that they seemed rather to be brute beasts than reasonable men, reflecting the very Likeness of the Word.” By “wickedness” here, Athanasius means a disordering of the will that prevents the intellect from accomplishing its own proper perfection.

      This is not just an abstract and theoretical point. It is an existential point and a sad impoverishment of the person (Athanasius calls it a “dehumanizing of mankind”). The sad thing is how the atheistic scientist forgets and loses himself in the over-statement of the horizon of his will. This is what Heidegger calls the “forgetfulness of Being” – the scientist loses any self-reflective experience of himself as experiencer when he reduces everything to the scientific mode and ignores the grounds and conditions for the possibility of his very inquiring mode. (An easy example of this are the scientific accounts of love one sometimes sees, which reduce it to some kind of chemical interaction. But where is the experiencing subject in that account? THAT is forgetfulness of Being!). We ask questions but forget the remarkable fact that I am myself the sort of thing that has questions! And so what does that mean? These “human questions” are at the heart of what your education should be about. This will include seeing a unity in the diversity of disciplines into which we have chopped up your education in what is now properly called a “multiversity” instead of a “university”. “Who am I? Where have I come from and where am I going? Why is there evil? What is there after this life?” (that is a list of example “human questions” from JPII’s encyclical letter Fides et Ratio). How do I integrate what the physicist says with what the psychologist says, and that with what the philosopher says? And how to integrate all of that into my own experience of myself of a person who is the kind of being who has these questions to begin with?!

      I wish I was King of USU – I would make everyone read the Venerable John Cardinal Henry Newman’s Idea of a University when they entered USU as freshman.

      I am increasingly coming to a place where I just don’t take any thinker seriously who does not take seriously these “human questions” as lived human questions. It is one reason, I hasten to add, why I continue to take Nietzsche very seriously. But it is also the reason that I am increasingly not taking the “new atheists” (who are in a complete forgetfulness of Being) seriously at all.

      By the way, I am not online as much in the summers as I care for my children. So I apologize in advance if I am not a big part of this or other discussions this summer.

    • I hasten to add: I in no way meant my post as a personal attack on Craig. I used Craig’s post as an occasion to make a broader point. It is for Craig to decide whether he fits into the description of atheism and the disordered relationship between intellect and will that I described in my post.

    • That’s not why I reject the notion of god. That’s why I’d reject him even if he were real.

      I reject gods because of total lack of evidence. And because it’s silly.

    • Craig – your reply gets right to my point. Craig says:
      “That’s not why I reject the notion of god. That’s why I’d reject him even if he were real. I reject gods because of total lack of evidence. And because it’s silly.”

      A few remarkable things about this comment.
      1) You readily admit that you would willfully reject the evidence EVEN IF your intellect saw it. What a remarkable thing to say. In essence, you admit that you are not interested in conforming yourself to the truth. Seriously, can it get more “dogmatic” (in the bad sense of that word) that this? At this point, there is no point in making arguments because your admit your will would reject the truth that it does not like even if it saw it. Truly remarkable.

      2) More to the point of my initial argument: What you presume here is that your intellect and will work in isolation of each other. You presume your intellect could properly apprehend the evidence no matter what condition the will was in. So you act as if the intellect could do its work, and then the will would have to choose to accept what the intellect says or not.

      But this is precisely my point. The intellect and will do not operate in radical isolation of each other. Quite to the contrary, a disordered will can cripple the intellect. It could go the other way too, a disordered intellect could impair the will in its proper functioning. (Man by nature desires / wills the good, but if our intellect is confused about what is actually good, our will cannot achieve its proper end).

      Let’s look at Plato’s Republic. In the education of the guardians and ultimately the philosophers, they are not even allowed to think about the highest things until they have rightly ordered their passions and wills. Plato is keenly aware that the intellect and will are intimately connected. If the will and passions are not properly ordered, your intellect will not see what is see-able (knowable). And so there is a long and intense moral formation of the passions and will that are a necessary propaedeutic to intellectual engagement with first principles and the highest things.

      Point is, Craig’s rebuttal simply motivated my point — I encouraged people to think seriously about the relationship between the will and the intellect. And that if you live out a wrong view of the will (radical autonomy) this can disable your intellect from seeing God’s fingerprints.

      On an auto-biographical note: in my own conversion from life-long atheism (and I was an absolutely militant atheist in college), there was nothing wrong with my intellect. But I was willing to not see what was see-able. My will had to turn before my mind could (again, Plato, in order to see the True, Good, and Beautiful the cave-dwellers must turn their “whole soul”). Now that my will is properly oriented, my intellect apprehends the evidence of God quite readily, and I look back astonished that I did not previously see what is now so apparent. (note: I can imagine an atheist telling a similar story … which means we still have work to do in getting clear on the relationship between the will and the intellect, and work to do in sorting out what the proper end of both is).

    • One more example from texts some of you may have read. In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, he does not allow bad people to engage in the discussion about what is good for man. Why not? Because the disordered state of their passions and will would make it impossible for their intellect to ‘see truly’ in matters of ethics.

      I could go on and on and on with examples of this in the classical tradition. It is all over all of the great thinkers, is a major theme in the early Church fathers (which is ground zero in terms of the biblical tradition’s encounter with greco-roman thought), and is a theme taken up through the philosophical and literary of the ancients (see Virgil for a good example) up through the 13th century (Aquinas, Bonaventure). This notion that the intellect, will, and the passions have no connection is a very recent idea. I think it largely stems stems from the really bad metaphysics and anthropology of modernity – Cartesian dualism which sees the mind as one thing and the passions as simply part of a mechanical body, the two of which have very little to do with each other.

    • It’s fascinating how much you read into my statements that isn’t actually there. You project a whole hell of a lot. I never, not once, said that I’d ignore evidence for god if it presented itself. Nor would I ever. I believe in provable reality. If convincing evidence for a god were to come about, and it were more convincing than the arguments and evidence against the existence of gods, then I’d believe in a/gods. I probably still wouldn’t worship, but I’d believe.

      Your problem is that you think that the existence of gods is plausible, and not just plausible, but actually exists, regardless of the fact that absolutely no evidence supports that hypothesis, and there are a lot of reasons why we should reject the god-hypothesis. It is you who is dogmatic in insisting on the plausibility of a hypothesis as silly as the god-hypothesis.

    • I apologize if I read too much into your remarks. I was responding to your having said this:
      “That’s not why I reject the notion of god. That’s why I’d reject him even if he were real.”
      You said you would reject him even if he were real. I guess I read into this: you would reject God even if you knew he were real. In other words, I took you to mean that you would reject God even if there was evidence, then you went on to say you don’t think there is any anyway. This seemed a plausible reading of the statement. But it sounds like I misunderstood you, so I apologize.

  2. Sorry for the series of posts. I might just point out, to the point of whether having evidence that God exists would weaken the place for faith, that Scripture itself says otherwise. The Bible tells you that you do not need faith to know God.
    Romans 1:20 – For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse.

    In other words, the Bible points you to natural theology – the possibility of knowing that God exists and some of the attributes of God through an exercise of natural reason reflecting on the orderliness of creation.

    So the point of my posts, in a nutshell, has been this: it is not true that there is insufficient evidence. There is more than enough evidence. Athanasius says, “God knew the limitation of mankind … and so as a safeguard against their neglect of his grace, He provided them the works of creation also as a means by which the Maker might be known.” In other words, Athanasius things God made himself readily apparent through the mirror of the natural order of creation.

    But some people don’t see the data as evidence for God, but this is not because of their intellects but because of their wills. Athanasius argues that this is why Christ became incarnate (the quotations above are from his book “The Incarnation of the Word of God”). Athanasius says, “What was God to do in the face of this dehumanizing of mankind, this universal hiding of the knowledge of Himself by the wiles of evil spirits? Was He to keep silence before so great a wrong and let men go on being thus deceived and kept in ignorance of Himself?”
    These are really remarkable passages. God’s knowledge was not hidden, it was hidden not by God but was hidden by man’s will and man’s turning away from the overflow of evidence for God. So what was God to do? This is funny, actually. It is almost like God’s credibility is on the line here. What, is God going to sit back and let man (his own creation!) turn away from Him. No! So he sends Christ to “renew His Image in mankind”.

    Okay, I think I am done now. That was fun – something of a synthesis of one of the major themes of the week-long seminar I just attended in New Hampshire.

  3. The issue, kleiner, is that even if this originated in the will, it is not a will that Craig (or others who have the same position) freely choose or can freely choose to change. If you are a Calvinist, then this line of argumentation will make sense, and be consistent with human experience. Of course, if you are a Calvinist, then there are certain other conclusions that follow if you follow that through (namely, some people *aren’t* elect. Some people will remain in their reprobation. Boo hoo.)

    It’s not as if Craig says, “Hmm…I will to be autonomous, and therefore my worldview will conform to that.” Rather, if he values autonomy, that is because that is within his personality. If he has a framework that doesn’t see deity within the evidence of the universe, then that is within a logical framework as a result of how he is.

    In other words…if you want to use the universe as evidence of God’s lack of hiddenness, and then point out a discrepancy with the psychologies of some humans to account for the claim of hiddenness, then it’s just as easy to say that the “will” of humankind *is* part of the case for the hiddenness of god.

    If you want to attribute these things to a fall, then what the fall shows is that God creates broken stuff. He created humans with the capacity to fall…the consequences, then, cannot and are not divorced from him.

    Why is it that a universe that supposedly broadcasts God’s existence and powers looks precisely the same as a universe that can be described without God’s existence?

    In talking about the “forgetfulness of being,” I don’t think you adequately address this. After all, let’s take your example of the chemical mechanics of something like love. This doesn’t exclude the *experience* of love…it just points out that the causes of such love need not be anything more or less than definite chemical reactions. Unless God is in the chemicals, there isn’t a need to “stuff” him in such a feeling.

    These “human questions” are good; I agree. I don’t think people *forget* them. I think they recognize that the place they serve is a different place than people want to think of them as. For example, the human experience of love doesn’t point to anything transcendent. It points to human subjectivity. Similarly, human questions like “Who am I?” do not point to anything transcendent. They point to human subjectivity.

    You say that some people “will” themselves to autonomy. Perhaps instead it is the case that, face with existential angst, some people commit the philosophical suicide of forgoing their human subjectivity to something or someone else. Perhaps instead of saying that the people who “will” themselves to autonomy (whatever that means) are forgetful of being, we should say that those who understand and recognize this autonomy are far more attentive to being than those who abdicate it.

    • A few responses:

      1) I am not a Calvinist.

      2) I reject the view that Andrew seems to propose – that certain philosophical beliefs are a function of “innate” and immovable “personality” or psychology. There are various different views of the will out there, I don’t think Craig or anyone else is simply determined to hold one view over any other. Now it is not as simple as anyone saying, “I choose this view”. For the most part – especially for non-philosophers who do not actively reflect on such things – we fall into certain views as a function of our culture, the particular ordering of our passions (our “psychology”), our politics and other beliefs. Though there is also a sense in which we choose our beliefs within this context.

      I’ll leave it to the readers of the blog. Does the view of oneself that Andrew proposed correspond with anyone’s experience? Do you experience yourself as having a fixed and immovable psychology, such that a set of beliefs about any manner of things (including the extent of the will) is simply a result of “how one is” and not something one “can freely choose to change”? If this were our experience, why would we ever question anything, or criticize others? If religious people are just working out their own determined psychology, what is the ground of the atheistic criticism?

      Actually, this really gets to one of my points. The scientist is so used to treating everything as a thing for which a complete account can be given by simply providing an account of the complex of determined material causation that they entirely forget themselves. Let me put it another way: by being in the habit of thinking of oneself in this reduced way, Andrew simply takes it as a foregone conclusion that there is no possibility for the cultivation of the interior. Thinking that our beliefs are simply the function of a psychology and “personality” (a result of “how he is” and not something he even “can freely choose to change”), there is no consideration of the cultivation of the interiority of the subject. Instead we just robotically work out the “logical framework” which falls out of determined psychology. But, again, this completely forgets the lived experience of the subject. As a description of my experience of myself, nothing could be further from how I experience myself. Instead, quite to the contrary, I experience myself as a “task” that has to be undertaken, as an engagement between an “interiority” and others, etc etc.

      So Andrew is right – it point to human subjectivity. The question, though, remains since we still need to work out human subjectivity in a way that has fidelity to our actual experience. Scientific bracketing of the questioner in asking the question will, in this sense, always result in the forgetfulness of being (Heidegger really nails this in Being and Time).

      Related to this point, I don’t think I used the turn of phrase, “will themselves to autonomy”. If I did, that was a sloppy expression. My point was just this – different views of the will (autonomy and heteronomy) and different views of freedom can have an effect – and I suggested a disordering effect – on the intellect and its proper ends. And I did not take Craig’s point about autonomy to be a theoretical one, as if religion did not accord with his conception of the autonomy of the will. Rather, his point was more an assertion of the will itself (who is God to rule me? he asked) rather than a removed intellectual judgment about the nature and extent of the will.

      3) My whole point was that the merely scientific view does NOT describe the world (and more importantly the subject) in a sufficient way. What is does not and cannot describe is the mode of existence of the experiencing subject – the scientist himself with his mode of existence that involves asking questions!

      This does not mean that the scientific view is false. I see no reason to doubt that certain chemicals are released or certain neurons are fired when I am around someone I love. I hasten to point out that this is not news – Aquinas knew 700 years ago, and Aristotle over 2000 years ago, that the body is involved when we think and feel. So this is hardly a news flash. What modern science does is provide a much more accurate and sophisticated accounts of what the body is doing. But the applause for these scientific discoveries comes with this catch – that science was operative on the presumption that nature is orderly and lawful.

      Point is – the scientific account of love is one way of explaining the phenomenon. And you are right that this way of explaining it does not exclude the experience. But my point was that this way of explaining it does not take up the experience and the experiencing subjects. So there is a kind of self-forgetfulness (forgetfulness of Being) in that mode of inquiry. Why? Because that way of explaining love is not totalizing, there are other perspectives and other modes of knowing which disclose other true things about love. And, again, my point is that the scientific mode of knowing tells us nothing about the phenomenology, so to speak, of the actual experiencing subject. It should be obvious by now that, as much as a appreciate the discoveries of science because I love truth wherever it is found, I think that science excludes discussion of the most important things precisely because it brackets the experiencing subject. What we should be aiming for is a kind of education that allows us to integrate all of these different views of the human person and the world (physics, biology, chemistry, history, psychology, sociology, literature, ethics, etc etc etc).

      5) I think if we were to get rid of the language that people already have settled opinions on, we would see that the experience of love and the experience of beauty involve something more than mere “subjectivity”. In fact, it is the experience of love and beauty that precisely draw me out of my subjectivity and into something other than myself. From my own experience with love and beauty, any account that did not account for the existential experience would be incredibly lacking. One uses the word “transcendence” and the conversation ends. So don’t use the word – but be honest with yourself about your own experience when you experience genuine love or see something so beautiful that you forget yourself. My point here is that the experience of subjectivity demands an account of subjectivity that is relational. This is simply going to require a vocabulary that is beyond science. The bottom line is that you have to do metaphysics or “fundamental ontology”.

      Had more time than I usually will today. Plus I’ve been thinking about all of this for a week so was able to rattle off long thoughts in about 10 minutes. Anyway, take no offense if I don’t post again on this stream for 2 weeks.

    • I see that I am ranging away from the original issue – the hiddenness of God. My nutshell point from the initial post still, I think, stands. Consider whether the lawfulness and orderliness of nature (which all scientists must presuppose and which cannot be demonstrated by science but rather is the condition for the possibility of science) is evidence for something we typically call “God”. Why do some intellects grasp this while others do not? I say it is not because there is a problem in the intellect for those that do not see what the orderliness of nature suggests. I argued that it is an error of the will that disorders the intellect and prevents it from seeing what it could, by its own natural lights (no revelation required) be able to see.

      Now I can understand why some SHAFTers might be uncomfortable with discussions of the will to begin with. If you are a materialist, then you really have to be a determinist. At that point, I don’t think you have any business talking about the problem of evil or anything like that to begin with.

      It is worth noting the humor in all this. Notice that it was the Popes of the Catholic Churhc – John Paul II, in Fides et Ratio, (following Leo XIII in Aeterni Patris in 1879) – who had to make an argument to the world about the value of reason. Notice too that I, the “dogmatic” Catholic, actually has a higher view of reason than really anyone else on this blog. Let it not be said that we live in uninteresting times!

  4. To kleiner:

    1) I didn’t suspect such. I’m just saying that the point you’d be making would be more theoretically convincing were it from a Calvinist standpoint. The will just doesn’t appear to operate as you want it to.

    2) The view that you counter with isn’t necessarily “opposed” or “incongruent” with the view I proposed. I do not doubt or deny the aspect of cultural upbringing, etc., etc., Nevertheless, I note that to the extent people aren’t precisely automatons as their cultural upbringings would dictate suggest to me that there is another factor that people often miss.

    This factor, to speak simply, isn’t chosen…but if I had to speak more complexly, then I would say that if it is chosen, it isn’t chosen in a “free” way. (Which is why I think that what you are proposing would make more sense in a Calvinist way. Sure, sure, humans “choose” their action, but they aren’t “will neutral.” Rather, if people have a sin nature [which people would assert we do], then we will “choose” sin. Nothing “free” about it.)

    My question to the readers of the blog, to get to MY point, would be this. Many of you grew up in the church. Did you “choose” what you believed it? Or rather, did you simply believe in what seemed likely to you at the time. Did you “choose” what seemed likely to you? Did you choose what evidence seemed compelling or uncompelling?

    If you had a crisis of faith, could you “choose” to end that crisis of faith? Could you CHOOSE to believe in what you had once believed in? Could you choose to quell your doubts and have things go back to normal?

    I would argue that no, people don’t operate like this. Rather, they have some internal framework of evaluating data, and this internal framework leads to certain conclusions. you don’t choose the framework, and you don’t choose the conclusions. You can only hope — maybe — to find disconfirming evidence that, when it churns through your internal logical framework, supports a different conclusion. Sometimes this happens involuntary (a big life experience)…sometimes this happens gradually. It is true that you can pick the data you look at, but you never consciously choose when you are convinced…you are really gaming…gambling against an internal framework of belief, persuasion, etc.,

    As a result, it’s easy to understand why we DO question things and why we DO criticize others. Because we have internal frameworks and we live in societies that may not mesh entirely with those frameworks. (This goes back to the point I was making earlier: people aren’t automatons of their culture and zeitgeist. To the extent they are not, they question, they doubt, they rebel, they are unhappy, they feel out of place, they feel uneasy.)

    But let’s ask another question? Are there some things that people don’t question and they don’t criticize? Of course. These things differ a bit by person, but the parts of the internal framework are assumed. There are tenets people take for granted. As Rorty described, there is a “final vocabulary” whose contingency is taken for granted. One doesn’t choose it. One doesn’t consciously change it. I think we could find some similarities by grouping certain people by internal framework, but it wouldn’t span the entirety of humanity, and it wouldn’t necessarily point to a deity (unless what it points to is a kind of internally distinguished “Tower of Babel” where, even though people are speaking the same external language, they cannot *understand* the positions of others.)

    If religious people are just working out their own determined psychology, what is the ground of the atheistic criticism

    This is one of my points, actually. If you notice, a lot of atheist/theist dialogue goes nowhere? Why is that? It’s because the two parties aren’t seeing eye-to-eye (or mind-to-mind) because there is a distinct difference in internal psychological framework. The problem? Because people’s final vocabularies are so rarely (if ever) questioned for their contingency, people assume, “My way is the right, logical, rational, (righteous, holy, divine) way. People who believe otherwise aren’t simply different, but wrong, illogical, irrational, sinful, unholy, blasphemous.”

    The point I’d make (and I try to be careful, recognizing that I’m speaking out of what makes sense to me) is that each side should realize that, however strongly they believe in their side, their side is not necessarily universally right, logical, rational, righteous, holy, divine, or good just because they perceive it so.

    You make a critique of the scientist who “forgets himself” by being so focused on material causation, etc., The extent I agree with you is that I think that many scientists have internal frameworks that “understand” materialism, and process data in materialistic ways. The extent I disagree with you is that I don’t think that because of this, these scientists (or other individuals who have such a framework) forget themselves. Rather, I think it is that since they do not “know” or “remember” themselves in a way that is amenable to YOUR framework, you want to say that they have forgotten themselves.

    I don’t think this is ever going to be an effective argument. At best, it preaches to (your) choir, in the same way a group of “new atheists” talking about how theists are so “irrational” (using their particular ideal of rationalism) is only preaching to (their) choir.

    My point was just this – different views of the will (autonomy and heteronomy) and different views of freedom can have an effect – and I suggested a disordering effect – on the intellect and its proper ends.

    OK, then I’ll simply point out that this is basically the same critique of “new atheists” against theists. You don’t prove anything. You don’t prove a disordering effect. Because you haven’t *proven* the proper order of intellect or the proper ends of intellect.

    Rather, what you (and every other group) is doing is conflating their own sense of the order of the intellect, of the proper end of intellect, etc., with what must be a universal order or end of the intellect.

    So, you don’t move us anywhere different. You won’t reach anyone but people who already are inclined to be reached by such an argument.

    3) I didn’t argue that the scientific view does describe the entire world, although I can think of plenty of people who might argue such. (and I can point out that what you’d be saying wouldn’t be convincing. You haven’t shown that the experiencing of qualia is something separate/more from the material components) Rather, I’m arguing that whatever framework you’re using, you haven’t established the case for its primacy. So you’re bringing up existential questions as if 1) the scientist doesn’t answer them, 2) your framework is the right/only valid way to answer them and give them context.

    You continue to bring up self-forgetfulness of being, but in the end, you aren’t really talking about reality. That the scientist describes the chemical makeup of love doesn’t mean that he is forgetful of the experience of love. It also doesn’t mean that he must buy into your framework of the experience of love or its context.

    In fact, he could argue that the experience of love, as opposed to its chemical makeup raise up important truths that you distinctly oppose. The subjectivity of love is personal. Not indicative of a universal truth. The objectivity of love is universal…those chemical apply the same across the spectrum. The subjectivity means that those chemical reactions may occur in responses to different things in different levels, but the objectivity gives us the mechanism to study it.

    What I am saying is this: to continue to use an analogy of love is curious, especially if you want to apply it to God and religion. You’d have to accept, if you wanted to carry things out further, that in the same way people can be attracted to very different things (not only different features, but different genders…species…etc., etc.,), people can be “attracted” to different philosophies, religions, etc., Just as the experience of love or the perception of attraction does not objectively prove the attractiveness or loveliness of the object (because someone else can think that person is unattractive), an experience of the spiritual is not indicative of anything final, ultimate, or objective.

    This has practical implications. No one is saying, “Don’t pay attention to love. It’s not real.” NO ONE IS SAYING THAT. So the “forgetfulness of being” thing really doesn’t apply. Rather, people point out that the experience of love, while great, while it should be taken as what it is, should be understood in a particular context. You may not have found “the one.” You may not be so desperately in love forever. Just because you are attracted to x, you don’t have to hump every x that moves. Your answers aren’t necessarily binding to anyone but you, however.

    5) (where did 4 go?) I think, perhaps, that IF people are becoming “forget of being,” it is an onslaught that religion has perhaps helped to stoke. I’m going to become pretty unreasonable now, because this is a close issue that matters to me. Don’t you EVER dare to speak as if you can talk about someone whom you think doesn’t or hasn’t experienced beauty and love.

    When someone feels — truly feels — love and they are told it is WRONG. That they must NEVER act on it. That it is SINFUL. It is a temptation that will be eliminated in the next life. It is unnatural, disorderly, whatever. Then I don’t think you can come by then and say that they are not taking into consideration their being.

    No, these people take their being VERY into consideration. They are racked with their being as opposed to their community, as opposed to their society, as opposed to their religion. Twould be better if they COULD get rid of their beings, THEY THINK. THAT IS DISORDERLY. And many people DIE for that disorderly thinking.

    It is insurmountable. THAT is existential.

    I can only think that that is what phrases like, “Forgive them father, for they know not what they do” were REALLY made for, but people can be so blind! This experience is not shared. Others will not even recognize what they feel for what it is — the profound beauty of it. Yes, the profound “transcendence” of it.

    I think that if you want to talk about love, then you’re going to have to confront ideas of love that you disagree with or wrong. And then you’ll come to the realization that, at some point, you don’t give a darn about the experience, because you are entirely willing –perhaps — to fight against someone and hold someone down for their experience.

    And as a result, you have to realize that you yourself don’t even practice what you claim to preach. You have a different vocabulary that has already defined what you think is good, righteous, holy, normal, rational, whatever…and it DIFFERS. You call what you disagree with “disorderly” and try to wave it off, but you fail to realize the EXPERIENCE that people have.

    • Very thorough response. My final reply will be a bit flip. Since, on your view, we are operating out of different frameworks, it appears dialogue becomes impossible. So I will step out of this debate and engage those who think dialogue is possible.

    • This is not a substantive point, but I do want to “save” the language of the forgetfulness of Being. That turn of phrase comes from Martin Heidegger, a man who is (by many accounts) an atheist. And this is not a philosopher who is seeking to “impose” his frame work on others (whatever the hell that even means). In fact, you might say that his entire project is an attempt to deconstruct “frameworks” to get “behind them” to original questions and primordial experience.

      Anyway, it would be a shame it readers of this blog came to read that phrase as simply the tool of the religious to talk down science. It is not that at all, not in how I have used it and not how Heidegger uses it.

      I end with by repeating my recommendation: Walker Percy’s “Lost in the Cosmos” is an excellent read. Seriously, you will have more fun with very few other books, it is just a delight. The point of this “last self-help book” is pretty simple – it is a strange situation when people know more about Jupiter than they know about themselves. Why does man continue to be a mystery to himself even though he is with himself all the time?

      I am not here asking for an answer to that question. In fact, Percy does not attempt to answer the question in Lost in the Cosmos. He just uses a series of funny and insightful thought experiments to motivate the question. In a way, the answer is less important than having – and living – the question. But it is a particular kind of question, a question that is not like other questions. This because the questioner is himself the object of the question. Isn’t that strange?

  5. As for the second post (to get back on topic):

    The orderliness of the universe doesn’t point to God. At best, for your case, it could point to a kind of deist clockmaker (but not the judeo-christian god), but at worst, it points to…the universe. Deism or pantheism.

    I think that the issue is that some people find it reasonable to anthropomorphise the universe –adding in another entity in the process — and others don’t.

    • I did not mean to pack much into “God” there. Neither does Aquinas or other philosophers who make arguments for the existence of God. No one is saying you can prove the Trinity or that God is Love or anything like that, much less Christianity taken as a whole. All I think natural reason can get to is a transcendent Creator who has certain attributes (eternal, immutable, etc). So I am fine with the argument leading to deism. That would be a HUGE first step for most atheists (it was, in fact, my first step away from atheism).

    • Who says the universe is ordered, or rather why? Just because (most of the time) planets don’t willy-nilly go crashing into each other doesn’t mean it’s been ordered. This is the same, false argument as arguing that because life exists on earth, then it’s therefore been created explicitly to support life. Universal forces work simply because they do. Life exists simply because it does. The smallest difference in our planet’s chemistry, or in the gravitational constant of the universe, and none of us would exist. That’s not an argument that someone fine-tuned it. It’s not an argument for anything, really. Life exists on earth because the circumstances of earth just happened to not be antithetical to life. The fact we live on a planet and in a universe where we can even exist is argument only for the fact that we live in a universe and on a planet where life is able to exist. That’s it. It’s not only not an argument for theism, it’s not an argument for deism or any sort of supernatural anything. There’s no evidence of explicit ordering.

      All that means is that the four fundamental universal forces interplay such that a certain kind of equilibrium where everything doesn’t collapse or explode all at once, one of the consequences of which is that life is possible, at least on earth. To assume that the intended consequence is life, or that someone/thing intended it, or even more so set it up so that such a consequence would arise is an unwarranted conclusion because of utter lack of evidence.

    • “Universal forces work simply because they do.” Is that supposed to be a satisfactory account? That argument is supposed to have more force than mine?!

      Who says the universe is ordered? Well, the scientist, to begin with (I am setting aside for the moment some of the complexity theories Hunt refers to). Look, the scientist takes his observations and uses them to predict future behaviors. But his observations of past events only tell us something about the general laws of nature on the assumption that nature is uniform (that is, orderly and lawful).

      I don’t blame the scientist qua his scientific inquiry for not taking up the question, because he doesn’t need to. All the scientist need do is assume the uniformity of nature. But people who have not become scientistic ought to ask the question, which really is a metaphysical question. I asked it myself, and was led to theism.

      Please note, I am NOT making an argument from complexity. I think those “design” arguments are bad arguments, and the frankly misunderstand the classical design arguments (like Aquinas’). My argument has nothing to do with complexity or fine-tuning. My argument is simply this: the world is orderly. Orderliness requires explanation since things might not have been orderly. An argument to a transcendent Creator is the best explanation.

    • Of course it’s not satisfactory. It’s not meant to be. Trying to impute cosmic meaning into everything is what religion tries to do. I don’t think there is a “why” for why everything works, why life exists. Life just does. I don’t require a cosmic meaning in order to have a good, happy, productive life. Your explanation might be more satisfactory to some, but it’s totally devoid of evidence. As such, it’s a silly idea, equally silly as Russell’s teapot, the FSM, Zeus, Buddha, and invisible pink unicorns, all of which are just as likely (but far more fun) as your god.

      The fact of seeming orderliness does not require a being to have so ordered it. That’s my point. It seems to YOU to be ordered, probably because we as humans are overprogrammed by evolution to recognise patterns, and assume every event not only has a cause, but a causer. The only reason the universe seems to be ordered is because we’re alive. We just happened to evolve in the universe that exists. If the universe weren’t the way it is, it might have only lasted a few seconds, or matter would never have formed, or it might have been too diffuse to form stars or planets, or a million other possibilities. The fact that we are alive is not an argument for a creator of order, but only that this universe happens to exist in such a way that allows life to exist at all. Just because relative disorder might have happened (but didn’t) isn’t reason to posit the existence of a god who ordered the universe. Who then ordered/created god? If we need to explain the existence and creation of the universe with a being who created it, you have the problem of infinite regress. The universe happened through natural laws, just as our evolution and the evolution of all life happens through natural laws. We don’t need to posit the existence of the supernatural, because we don’t need it as an explanation for anything, and because we have no evidence for the existence of anything supernatural.

    • A predictable response. Someone who has reduced all knowing to scientific knowing, and so has reduced any all reasons to believe something o a thin sense of empirical evidence. Since not all basically human questions can be answered in that thin reduction, you simply dismiss the “why” questions. Oh, and you solidify your argument with a slew of broad characterizations about what “religion” does.
      If people on this blog find that compelling, then I am not sure what more to say.

      It is why I spend a considerable portion of my time on this blog arguing against reductionism. In this stream, I phrased that in terms of self-forgetfulness and forgetfulness of being. That is the cardinal error on which most other modern errors derive (cardinal means to hinge, so all other errors hinge on that cardinal error).

    • Craig, you are entirely missing the thrust of the argument, on various levels. I won’t take up the infinite regress point, since that point just misses what the argument points to entirely. But I want to take up the first step first. You said,
      “The universe happened [that is, what is now came to be] through natural laws”

      Agreed. There, we agree on something. My question is – where did those laws come from? Is this kind of lawfulness necessary to being? You seem to suggest that it is not, that these laws are only contingent to being (you say that the universe might not have been the way it is in terms of being orderly at all or in terms of having the particular natural laws that it has).

      My question, which seems a perfectly reasonable question: Why is the universe ordered in the way it is, when it need not have been so?

      Again, this seems a perfectly reasonable question. It is not a scientific question, because we are asking about something that cannot be empirically verified. It is a metaphysical question. But it is still the kind of question I would think “free thinkers” would want to encourage – why are things the way they are when they could have been otherwise? It is that basic question that drives almost all human inquiry. Odd that asking this question arouses such contempt from some atheists. Is it because you know in advance where the question will lead you, and you willfully do not want to go there? Is that “free thinking”?

    • The reason that question isn’t one I entertain is because it’s an unanswerable question. You can speculate until you’re blue in the face, but the fact is, any “answer” you come up with to that question, you’re pulling out of your ass. It’s pure, fact-free speculation that cannot be verified as either true, partially true, or complete hooey. That’s why I say it’s silly and pointless.

      And the reason it raises ire is because this type of fact-free thinking is what gives us homophobia, sexism, racism, religious wars, acid in the face of women who dare to read books, etc. It’s certainly an interesting thought-experiment, but as soon as you start acting and living by these speculations, it gets dangerous.

    • More than anything else, that response / non-response gives me good reason to not engage Craig any further.
      Again, the claim that it is “fact free speculation” can be made only after one has reduced human inquiry to scientific modes. Do you have an argument for that, Craig? I rather doubt it.

    • I’m saying that the only kind of inquiry that has proven to reliably result in verifiable truth is scientific inquiry. I’m saying that whatever other forms of inquiry you seem to like, cannot in any useful fashion produce any sort of answer that can be verified as true/correct/real. Even if they’re useful for you and/or others, they can’t be shown to me to be true or real because they’re subjective experiences that don’t apply to other people.

      If this is incorrect, then please explain how and what non-scientific methods can both reveal something that is true, and prove that that thing is true.

      I wasn’t evading your question, I was answering why I think your question is unanswerable, or at the very least, why all possible answers are equally (in)valid.

    • I am not going to give an exhaustive account here, such a thing could hardly be expected on a blog. But one immediate example comes to mind – mathematical reasoning can discern truth without appealing to induction (the scientific method).

      And I think there is such a thing as moral reasoning, and I am a moral realist (I don’t think morality is merely subjective, and if Craig thinks it is then I see no ground from which Craig could object to homophobia or the other things that religion allegedly encourages). Moral reasoning would move from general principles to particular conclusions.

      I also think metaphysics is a legitimate enterprise. I am not a rationalist, so I think all of our reasoning begins in sense perception. But I don’t think it has to end there. Rather we can deduce and infer various truths which are themselves not observable from what can be observed.

    • But invariably, the “truths” you deduce are going to conflict with “truths” another person deduces from the same set of stimuli and experiences. Who is right? Is everyone?

      And what does morality have to do with anything here? Yes, I am a moral relativist, but I reject the notion that that means I cannot logically consider homophobia immoral/unethical. Homophobia demonstrably harms people, and isn’t based either in fact or reason. Simple as that.

      “…homophobia or the other things that religion allegedly encourages”

      Allegedly? Do I really need to give you a list of religions that are/have been homophobic and the religious justifications for it? Are you seriously trying to call into doubt the fact that most homophobia stems from and is perpetuated by religions?

    • Will the truths that I deduce differ from others? Perhaps. Does that prove there is no truth? Absolutely not. At best it shows that truth can be hard to discern.

      Take your standard Intro to Logic example.
      1) All men are mortal
      2) Socrates is a man

      Now anyone who deduces from this that
      3) Socrates is NOT mortal
      is wrong. Assuming the premises are true, it is necessary to conclude that
      3)Socrates is mortal.

      Anyone whose mind does not move to that conclusion has a poorly formed or disordered intellect. Period. This is not me “imposing” my views on others. This is the laws of logic (the laws inherent to the function of reason itself) “imposing” itself on the reasoner. In the same way, gravity does not “impose” itself on me. It is a natural law to which my body is subject. People are free to deny that gravity exists, but that does not mean there is not truth to the matter. All it shows is that the person is either mentally impaired, incredibly ignorant or incredibly stupid. I would say the same thing about the failure of a person to properly deduce the conclusion from the above argument.

      Craig says he is a moral relativist and then goes on to say that he is not.
      Craig says homophobia is morally wrong. No disagreement there. Craig says (not unreasonably) that it is wrong because it “demonstrably harms people”. So Craig is not a relativist. You are probably some kind of a consequentialist or utilitarian. You make your moral judgment based in some relevant facts (consequences, who is harmed). If X causes pain than pleasure, then it is morally wrong.

      But that is not a relativist position. You are basing your moral judgment on some objective measure that is available to all (the consequences, the amount of harm produced). If morality was truly relative, then why should I give two shits about who gets harmed by homophobia? Maybe I like harming people. Who would you be to tell me that is wrong? It comes down to two competing opinions, neither of which has any claim to being objectively true. Believing such a thing is first and foremost morally obnoxious. It is also so logically sloppy that the kind of relativism that usually gets trumpeted around can be demolished in less than a class period in an ethics class.

      I am not going to take the bait of the last point, because I frankly don’t believe Craig is prepared to have a level-headed discussion about it. Suffice to say, I think lousy moral opinions can be perpetuated by any number of social institutions and personal practices. I won’t sit here and pretend that some religions have not perpetuated ugly moral ideas. Of course they have (as have non-religious social institutions). But it is equally absurd to claim that “religion” does this (which religion? All of them, some of them, …?). Craig said that religion “gives us” homophobia, racism, etc. That is just so much nonsense. But I smell Hitchens in the air here (religion is the cause of all evil in the world), and I am now to the point where I simply refuse to take that windbag seriously at all. He long ago stopped being someone worthy of serious consideration when it comes to debates about religion.

      I used to be an atheist. Atheism can do better than weak-kneed moral relativism and truth subjectivism outside of science, can’t it? Maybe it can’t. Again (prepare for beating of dead horse): formulate a secular atheistic humanism that provides an adequate philosophical anthropology and ethics or else atheism is going to get justly kicked around.

    • My idea of moral relativity is that there is no such thing as objective, universal morality. That it always depends on the situation, that the universe is totally amoral, and morality is totally a human construction. When I said that homophobia is immoral I meant that I believe it to be immoral. I cannot say that it is universally immoral because I don’t believe universal morality exists.

      I also never said that religion was the sole or root cause of bigotry. I only said it perpetuates it, with very few exceptions.

      That’s all the reply I’ve time for as I’m in the middle of moving.

    • This is a different conversation than the one on this stream, but one last thought to Craig on this:
      If morality is simply the expression of private feelings about things, then why do we bother arguing about it?

      If my wife tells me she feels sad, I do not argue with her. She has that feeling. It would be absurd for me to tell her she is wrong about her feeling, that she really doesn’t feel sad. She feels what she feels, and she feels sad. But if my wife tells me that Bach’s music is ugly or that murdering innocents is good, I will argue with her. Why? Because I think she is wrong. In this case, she is not talking about her own feelings, she is talking about the value of something outside of her (Bach’s music, etc).

      Point is, we don’t argue over private feeling or private belief. It is more than a waste of time to do so, it is utterly pointless and self-defeating.

      When Martin Luther King argued against racism, he did not frame it as an expression of his own private sentiment. If it was just his sentiment, then who cares? NO! MLK argued that racism was wrong, objectively and plainly wrong.

      I really don’t understand people who vigorously argue against moral wrongs (like homophobia) only to undercut any power those arguments could possibly have. I’ve looked at Craig’s blogs, he is obviously activated by the LDS treatment of homosexuals and the issue of gay marriage. But if morality is simply private sentiment, then why are you complaining about the sentiments of Mormons? Let them have their own private sentiments, just as you have yours. That would be like complaining about me saying I have a stomach ache! There would be no truth or falsity, no right or wrong, so it would be utterly pointless to make moral arguments. Saying “you are wrong in a world where there is no right or wrong” is just a self-defeating assertion.

      C.S. Lewis is very good on all of this in the first chapter of the ‘Abolition of Man’, a chapter called “Men Without Chests”. Moral relativists have no “chests”. Be bolder than that. Homophobia IS WRONG. Racism IS WRONG. The killing of innocents IS WRONG. Now we can and should argue about what makes these things wrong (motive, consequence, state of character of the actors, etc), but those that deny that those things are really wrong make me really worried.

      I am of the opinion that there are no real moral relativists in the world, even those who say they are. As an easy exercise in demonstrating this: on the first day of my ethics classes, I ask if anyone is a relativist. Some raise their hands. Then I say that all relativists will get an F in my class, because this is my own private sentiment and belief. What is their immediate response: “That is not fair!!!” In other words, relativists expect objective treatment and immediately make appeals to objective values when it is their ass on the line.

    • I still don’t agree with your definition of moral relativity. I think you’re taking the definition to an extreme that no one practises. Or rather, you’re assuming that moral relativists are absolutely relative, rather than relatively relative. ;) Not sure if that makes sense even to me.

      You’re prevented from giving your students “F” i assume by other reasons than just that it’d be unfair (or to you immoral). I’m guessing it’d also be against the rules of the university, and you’d get in trouble for such an arbitrary judgement.

      My belief about morality is that there is no objective, universal morality. There is no god who had decreed what is and is not moral. The universe doesn’t care about morality. If other sentient species exist, we can expect then to have totally and completely different ideas and beliefs about morality (if at all). Our moral sense is a product of our evolution. Humans, because of evolutionarily programmed-in basic sense of morality, build on that sense and create a system of morality. This is what I mean by moral relativity. Certain ideas about morality depend highly on culture, whereas others are more basic ideas and common to almost all cultures. In this way, morality is relative. I have personally adopted the moral system where pain, harm, suffering are immoral or wrong, and are to be avoided as far as possible. I also believe that my moral system is a very good one, and that more people should adopt a similar system. This isn’t the same as believing in an objective or universal morality.

      Granted, I oppose things like homophobia, misogyny, racism, in all cultures, and believe that they are universally bad for humans. I believe this because of demonstrable harm, and the fact that I know of no instances of these that aren’t harmful. But a thing which is only sometimes harmful, but not always wouldn’t be in that same category.

      The reason I don’t say that my belief that homophobia is wrong is a type of universal morality is because it’s possible that in some other species, homosexuality could actually be harmful, and opposing homosexuality could be a positive thing for that species. It’s perhaps a silly example, but illustrates the way I think about what relative morality means.

      I’m certainly not an absolute relativist, but I’m far more a moral relativist than say Mormons who believe in a very rigid, unyielding, universal, and objective type of morality. They believe that homosexuality and everything to do with it is evil, wrong, immoral. Period. Sexism (at least their version of it) is moral. Period. When another culture’s mores conflict, then they are wrong. Period.

      This is what I think about when I think about objective moralities, and I very much do not think or believe that way. I hope this clears things up.

    • I’ve also enjoyed our discussion a lot and it’s certainly made me think a lot. And that is good.

    • Craig -
      Not that labels matter all that much at the end of the day, but when you bump into a philosopher and you call yourself a relativist, they will presume you mean something other than what you meant. You sound a lot like a utilitarian. For the utilitarian, morality is based on some fact about human nature (about which you might have an evolutionary story to tell), that we pursue pleasure and seek to avoid harm or pain. There are few moral values universal to all cultures (things like racism being bad, freedom being a good, etc), but the moral theory is highly situational and so you could get some variance from place to place and culture to culture or even particular situation to particular situation. Anyway, you might read something by Peter Singer or John Stuart Mill sometime (the most famous utilitarians, one older and one contemporary).

  6. Not saying dialogue is impossible. Just saying that the evidenced problems in dialogue are somewhat easy to explain, and as a result, we have to account for that.

    All I’m saying here is that if you’re going to come around with an agenda, then regardless of the background of the person whose terms you are dropping out, people are going to be rather suspicious. Especially when your agenda is to say, “You’re wrong. You’re disordered.” etc.,

    I guess as for the second thing you had said, the thing to point out is that it still *doesn’t* lead to deism for everyone. It doesn’t lead people to a clockmaker.

  7. Kleiner, I’ve given your comments some serious consideration (to the point of headache) and will respond within the next couple of days once I have the time to carefully articulate my rebuttal.

    And Andrew: I’m glad somebody took up Kleiner’s arguments. I hope to have something to add to what has already been a good discussion. I think more needs to be done on the front regarding order in the universe, though. You’re right to point out that it at best leaves us with deism, but I’m not satisfied with that response. I think the order we perceive in the universe can be consistent with atheism, and I’ll try to make that case as soon as I get the time.

    • One possible line to take, which Huenemann has flirted with before: One might say that being is just ordered, that being just “comes that way”. To use some philosophical jargon, argue that there is no possible world in which being is chaotic. Huenemann has never actually developed that argument, but it is a way of dodging the inference to a principle (“God”) who is responsible for the order of creation.
      I am skeptical of this, but it is one direction an atheist might go.

  8. I must admit I never quite understand this jargon of saying people have an “agenda” or are trying to “impose” their view on others when what they are doing is making philosophical arguments. Look, Jon posted on God’s hiddenness. I proposed an argument for why God seems to hide, suggesting that it is actually man turning from God in his will that prevents his intellect from seeing a God who has left sufficient evidence of himself in the created order. I don’t see this as being an “agenda” or as being something that is being “imposed”. It is an argument, and invitation to dialogue. It is worth pointing out that this argument is not unique to me. Lots of people make it (I relied on Athanasius in the post). For another example of a similar (though not identical) argument that some of you may be more familiar with, see Plato’s Republic. There Socrates argues that getting out of the cave requires a turning of the “whole soul” to the truth. As Socrates says, there is nothing wrong with the intellect of the cave-dwellers, they are just looking at the wrong things (a big part of which is their will and the ordering of their passions).

    The scientist never takes up the question of why the world is orderly. That is fine – scientific inquiry does not require taking up that question, it just requires assuming a certain answer to that question. But what are the conditions for the possibility of the scientist being a scientific questioner? That metaphysical or “ontological” question is forgotten by the scientist. This is what led me to the question of integrating our knowledge – how do we integrate what the physicist and chemist say about the human condition and the natural world with what poetry and music say? It strikes me that this is the domain of philosophy, and that includes metaphysics. What would taking up that question lead to for you? Anecdotally, I will say that my experience with more than a few atheists has been an experience with people who willfully refuse to take up this question of why the world is lawful.

    Sorry for the headache, Jon! One thing that might be useful – which is a rarity on blogs – is if we all had a text in common. I am no Athanasius, so I wish we could all read that text and then argue it out there. Without having a common text it makes it all the more difficult to have a common vocabulary and a “common rationality”. Forgive the moment of elitism, but I think this is a large part of the reason philosophical conversations are so stunted these days – few have read great books so they just don’t have a substantial philosophical vocabulary.

    Notice where we are on this issue of having a common rationality. See Andrew’s alleged problem of “frameworks” which views arguments as mere vehicles for pushing “agendas”. This is in a nutshell what Pope Benedict means by the “dictatorship of relativism” – the view that a common rationality is all but impossible for us now. On this view, reason has been rendered largely impotent. This is why I made the remark that I have a much higher view of reason that many on this blog. It is frankly why I think I am, as a Christian humanist, more of a humanist than many on this blog.

    The holiday weekend is over and I am back taking care of my girls. So I will not be a regular reader or contributor. Sorry.

    • Side comment regarding the will and the intellect and the idea of the university. The view of the modern university – that you can educate the intellect alone while not doing anything that even resembles moral or spiritual formation – is a very recent view. It is completely at odds with the nearly universal view of the ancients (both Greek and Roman), who say that the education of the intellect and the education of the will have to be tied together. Again, see the educational philosophy in Plato’s Republic for an example that most of you are probably familiar with. Count me as being on the side of the classical view on this one.

      Given the structure and curriculum of the modern university, is it any wonder that universities do not produce “whole persons” but instead fragmented persons with unconnected compartments of knowledge? In this sense, university education is a miscarriage of sorts. What a sad state of affairs. Remember that a university is, in some sense, a mother. She is your alma mater (nourishing mother, in Latin). There is a sense in which the university is an adopted mother, she gives birth to a “second you” (college students leave their parents not yet completely formed in moral, spiritual, and intellectual terms and the university is meant to birth a mature you). But what is the modern university giving birth to these days? Is it birthing whole persons? Is the modern university connecting the discoveries of science to the “human questions” I spoke of above? If it is not, are you learning much of real value?

    • Sorry for the string of posts. One last side comment. The great thing about this Seminar I attended (where we sat and read and discussed some great books around a table for a week) was that we had a physicist, a chemist, a bio-physicist (this guy’s work was fascinating), an economist, a business prof, literature people, as well as philosophers and theologians. That is so incredible rare in the academe today, to bring together all of those perspectives in a single and unified discussion of the truth of things.
      And it leads me to an important clarification: just as the scientist needs to ask the human questions, it is equally true that those in the humanities need to do far more science.

    • Will there be some proceedings of this conference?

    • Vince – no proceedings from the conference come out. It is not an academic exercise in that sense. The aim is to get 15 or so people who are interested in the liberal arts and the Catholic intellectual tradition together to actually do some readings (instead of sitting around talking about how no one does liberal arts anymore, we sit down and do it). The hope is that these faculty will return to their home schools and re-energize programs there.

  9. @ Kleiner: You are in effect saying that I am willfully stupid! I am deeply insulted by this.
    I despise your sorry ass. Those are fighting words!

    • Very pleasant, Kuffar.
      Of course I am saying that atheists are wrong, but I never called them stupid. In fact, the whole point of my argument is that this is not an intellectual issue but an issue of the will. I do think many (most, all?) atheists are willful (hence my calling atheism an adolescent movement), but I never called them stupid. Keep in mind, I was an atheist for most of my life. Again, remember Plato’s allegory of the cave – there is nothing wrong with the cave-dweller’s intellect, he is just looking at the wrong things (and ultimately there is a story to be told about their wills and the ordering of their passions).

  10. Kleiner says,

    The scientist never takes up the question of why the world is orderly. That is fine – scientific inquiry does not require taking up that question, it just requires assuming a certain answer to that question. But what are the conditions for the possibility of the scientist being a scientific questioner? That metaphysical or “ontological” question is forgotten by the scientist. This is what led me to the question of integrating our knowledge – how do we integrate what the physicist and chemist say about the human condition and the natural world with what poetry and music say? It strikes me that this is the domain of philosophy, and that includes metaphysics. What would taking up that question lead to for you? Anecdotally, I will say that my experience with more than a few atheists has been an experience with people who willfully refuse to take up this question of why the world is lawful.

    This isn’t true, it’s just that a true account of “order” in the universe is only now beginning to be investigated scientifically and mathematically. Order emerges from chaos according to the so-called “theory of complexity,” which is only at its very beginning stages. I HIGHLY recommend the BBC program “The Secret LIfe of Chaos.” It’s only an hour long, but will give you a feeling for this new science. It starts here:

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jeCnWWH5AvM

    PS Unfortunately it’s probably true that even a number of scientists consider “complexity theory” borderline pseudo-science. It isn’t, and this contributes to the impression that science is doing nothing to address the fundamental question of why order exists.

  11. Vince (and others) – Levinas is all over this point, even though he would not want to frame it in terms of the “intellect” and “will”. But one of Levinas’ central insights is that autonomy and “egology” prevent you from “seeing” the “face” of the other. But the other (transcendence) is constantly calling, the voice is loud and clear. But the state of your will either allows or disallows you hearing the call.
    Students who have taken my Contemporary European Philosophy class (Heidegger, Derrida, Levinas, more Heidegger) probably already recognized this theme in my posts.

    • That sounded like utter gobbledygook.

    • I can see that this lingo looks like gobbledygook to the uninitiated. Of course, the tribal language of quantum mechanics looks like gobbledygook to the uninitiated too, but that doesn’t make it hogwash. I intentionally posted this post to a restricted group (Vince in particular, along with the SHAFTers that have taken my Contemporary Euro class), knowing full well that I was using some specialized jargon.

      A bit of unsolicited advice, Craig: try to avoid dismissing out of hand that which you do not understand. If you spend a few years reading Heidegger and Levinas, and then want to argue against this way of speaking things, then I will welcome your informed rebuttals.

    • Kleiner, I can’t really speak for Craig, but it seems to me that his intention is for you to write in a more accessible manner.

      This is a public blog for a group of students that have varied interests. Many are untrained (including myself) in philosophy. If you are more interested in having a discussion with only a few individuals, then maybe an email exchange would be more appropriate.

      I’m not saying that you shouldn’t comment here, just that it would be more welcoming and able to reach many more people if you wrote for the general instead of the for the few. Just my humble opinion anyway.

    • I’ve had a similar reaction to Kleiner before, as many might remember. I think it’s alright, as long as both sides realize that even the most elaborate and arcane of arguments can be toppled by some of the most innocent probes. For his part, Kleiner must make due with answers he might consider naive, keeping in mind that sometimes simple rebuttals can be the most effective. I, for instance, have attempted to reflect on this will/intelligence issue. My conclusion is that, yes, it is my “will” or personal preference that determines, to an extent, how I view the world. However, this doesn’t necessarily say anything against how I intellectually apprehend reality. I think the reason I prefer one way of looking at the world over others is because I believe it is the truth. In other words, will and intellect are aligned. If this weren’t true, then I’d simply be fooling myself, and I just don’t think that is so. Many Christians, of course, think I’m blind and disordered. Like St. Paul, they believe that if I donned some kind of Jesus goggles somehow I would suddenly see that God is evident all around me.

    • Or, alternatively, that my mind has been clouded by sinfulness or Satanic malfeasance. If this is true, I can only say that, like God, Satan is doing a wonderful job hiding himself.

    • Believe it or not, I actually try to speak in general terms. I don’t know that I am great at doing this, though my student evaluations seem to suggest that I am not bad at it. There is always a need to mix the high and the low, so to speak. I am sure I do not always strike the proper balance.
      Not so shirk responsibility, but I think blogs are just a lousy way of communicating (and I recognize the irony of me communicating this via a blog). The anonymity of it makes it very difficult. Conversations are best had among friends, since people know where others are coming from. The blogosphere is only a pseudo-community, in this sense.
      I know that Vince and some other readers of this blog are into Levinas, so I made a technical comment in order to demonstrate that what was at issue in this stream is connected to Levinas’ work. I thought it worthwhile, if only for the sake of the few, to make that connection.

    • I disagree. The anonymity of blogs is their strength and one must be on guard to the possibility that “nonymous” conversation is warped by adulterating factors that actually skew the truthfulness of conversation. Blog-versation is subject to impassioned outbursts and “acting out,” but at its best it is a purer form of human interaction due to the austerity of the medium. You must be wary of the ulterior context of intimate conversation, and this is absent in depersonalized interaction.

    • To Craig’s defense, I think it is important to acknowledge that contemporary continental philosophy (Heidegger, Derrida, Levinas, Sartre) has been shown time and time again to be argumentatively weak, full of rhetoric, and, sometimes, shear gibberish (See John Searle on Derrida).

    • I think the critiques like Searle’s have some traction against some of Derrida’s work. Derrida too often falls into cagey “obscurantism” (I think that is Searle’s word, taken from Foucault). I think Searle is right about that. And I think Searle is right that Derrida is prone to rhetorical flourishes that are wild exaggerations, resulting in him having a near fetish with the impossibility of everything.

      But I think it unfair to generalize that critique to the whole of contemporary continental philosophy. To say that figures like Heidegger or Levinas have been “shown time and time again to be argumentatively weak, full of rhetoric, and, sometimes, shear gibberish” is deeply unfair. A lot of this comes down to the divide between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy. Someone like Searle will make his points, but a reader of Heidegger (like me) will respond that the measures of analytic philosophy miss the point of what phenomenological philosophy is trying to do. I dare say there is not a single argument, in any ordinary sense, in all of Being and Time (Heidegger’s great work). But I do not take this as a weakness, it is just a different approach to philosophy. To show my colors a bit, it is an approach to philosophy that is living and breathing, rather than the extremely lifeless approach many analytic philosophers take. :)

      Still, point is taken. Plenty of smart people think most of continental philosophy is “poetry” at best and more likely gibberish. I think they are wrong, but smart people (like Searle) do say such things, so Craig was not totally out of line to say so.

  12. ^^^We could never say the same thing about the language of QM.

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